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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

11 NOV 1976

XR 76-3360

25X1 Dr. Edward Teller
Director at Large
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory
University of California
Livermore, California 94550

Dear Dr. Teller:

I want to thank you for your contribution to the latest assessment by the Intelligence Community on Soviet civil defense. Your special interest in the subject and your consultations with members of the intelligence working group preparing the assessment gave additional impetus and contributed substantively to their efforts. Attached is a copy of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, "Soviet Civil Defense," which was recently completed by the working group.

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In response to one of your suggestions, we planned to include as an annex to the memorandum an assessment

[Redacted Block]

[Redacted Block] Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning, is aware of your special interest in the assessment.

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Any comments you may have on the attached memorandum will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

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/s/ George Bush

George Bush

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Attachment:

[Redacted Block] (Cy 347)

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LETTER to Dr. Edward Teller (Lawrence Livermore Lab) re Soviet Civil Defense IIM

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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11 NOV 1976

The Honorable Malcolm R. Currie
Director of Defense Research
and Engineering
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Dr. Currie:

In view of your special interest in the subject, I am forwarding you a copy of the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, "Soviet Civil Defense," recently completed. The interest and findings of the Defense Science Board, Net Technical Assessment Task Force gave additional impetus and contributed substantively to the efforts of the intelligence working group assessing the Soviet civil defense program.

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Sincerely,



George Bush

Attachment:

 (Cy 348)

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LETTER to Dr. M. R. Currie (DDR&E) re Soviet Civil Defense IIM

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**Interagency
Intelligence
Memorandum**

Soviet Civil Defense

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
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
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PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

A review of the Soviet civil defense program leads us to conclude that:

- The program is more extensive and better developed than we had previously believed.
- The measures the Soviets are taking to protect their leadership, industry, and population could have a significant impact on both US and Soviet perceptions of the likely outcome of a nuclear exchange.¹

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Significant shifts in emphasis in the Soviet civil defense program occurred during the late 1960s and early 1970s. During that period the Soviets subordinated the entire civil defense program to military direction. They also increased their efforts to provide hardened command posts for the military and civilian leadership. At the same time, they modified to a degree their previous policy of mass evacuation of cities by placing somewhat greater emphasis on constructing hardened shelters within urban areas, a decision which they have attributed to concern that a nuclear attack could occur with little prior warning. Our study of Soviet civil defense has not revealed any major changes in the Soviet program since about 1971, nor does it suggest a crash program. Rather, the Soviets have been proceeding gradually but steadily to implement decisions evidently taken previously.²

¹ For the views of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, concerning the significance of Soviet civil defense measures, see the penultimate paragraph of the Summary and Conclusions.

² For the views of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, about the significance of the Soviet civil defense effort, see the final paragraph of the Summary and Conclusions.

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In reviewing what we know about the subject for purposes of this memorandum, we have acquired new appreciation of several aspects of Soviet civil defense:

- The subordination of the entire civil defense structure to military direction has resulted in a more effective organization for carrying out civil defense plans and operations. Civil defense training efforts concentrate on the personnel responsible for carrying out civil defense operations, rather than on extensive training of the general population.
- We have reconfirmed our previous judgment that hardened shelters and command posts are available for the top political and military leadership, and for military and civilian leaders at a number of capitals and military headquarters below the national level.
- Thus far, the hardened shelter program for urban areas is primarily for the protection of personnel judged by the Soviets as essential, rather than for protection of the general population.

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- We have determined that the Soviets have reserves of food supplies and fuel located outside urban areas which could be used to support the urban population following a nuclear attack on cities, provided it could be distributed effectively. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The most difficult problem for the Soviets would probably be to assure the survival of supply personnel, equipment, and communications, and to manage the complex distribution of supplies under chaotic conditions.

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[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] we know that the Soviets have an ambitious program and we
have a good understanding of their overall civil defense planning and
organization.

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